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This paper assesses U.S. national security policies in surveillance, detention, 
interrogation and torture, and targeted killing to determine whether they comport with 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The U.S. is 
responsible for adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Geneva Conventions. These human rights 
law documents can be understood through court decisions, congressional statutes, and 
widely accepted interpretations from organizations such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, and the UN Human Rights Council. Further, this paper offers 
prescriptions on how international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
can be updated to better deal with the current war on terror.  
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Literature Review 
The application of human rights law to this war on terror has been debated by 
scholars across the legal spectrum. There is debate about which law, IHRL or IHL 
applies, and when, including what amounts to international armed conflict so that IHL 
may apply. Further, scholars debate who is actually the enemy, complicated by a lack of 
definition for terrorism. Many scholars also broadly address emergency powers and the 
need for different laws during a time of war and how those laws impact liberties and 
human rights. Articles attempting to describe or construct a proper balance between 
national security and human rights have reached different conclusions on where that line 
should be drawn. Other work has been written regarding gaps in the laws of war, how 
those laws apply to the war on terror, and how those gaps can be addressed to create a 
better framework for applying the laws of war that better protects human rights. 
It is now well accepted that both IHRL and IHL can apply at the same time. IHRL 
applies at all times, while IHL applies in times of armed conflict.1 In times when there is 
a conflict in applying both laws, the lex specialis is applied.2 Laura Olson, a visiting 
scholar at the University of Notre Dame Law School, discusses some of the practical 
challenges of applying both IHRL and IHL to internment, and how differences in IHRL 
and IHL can give rise to complications when applying international law to internment.3 
Olson highlights the importance of the complementary applications of both bodies of law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See infra note 64. 
2 U.N. Office of High Commissioner, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 
1, HR/PUB/11/01 (2011) [hereinafter UNHC Legal Protection]. 
3 Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-
International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437 (2009). 
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when pointing out that IHL alone lacks sufficient detail of the procedural regulations 
required for internment, while IHRL provides additional protections that creates greater 
procedural protection.4 For example, IHL rules prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, which is very general, while IHRL rules prohibit arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
except for reasons previously established by law, which is more specific and protective.5 
However, she states that there are difficulties in applying both bodies of law when it is 
not clear how the lex specialis should be applied. For example, she questions the use of 
lex specialis “in an international legal system which lacks hierarchy and institutional 
structures.”6 Therefore, who should decide which is the most protective, inclusive law?  
Other issues in applying bodies of law to the War on Terror are in deciding when 
an international conflict is taking place, and defining the enemy. If the level of a conflict 
doesn’t rise to a level of armed conflict, it is governed by only international human rights 
law and law enforcement powers. David Turns discusses the first question, when a 
conflict is deemed international, and therefore requires the application of IHL. Turns 
mentions the ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court in declaring that conflict between 
Israelis and Palestinians was an international armed conflict, seeming to state that most 
rules in armed conflict are the same, regardless of the classification of the conflict, or the 
fact that the conflict occurs between states and terrorist organizations.7 The Court held 
that the conflict between a state and terrorists was one of an international armed conflict 
because the armed conflict crossed borders of the State and took place within a context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Id. at 442. 
5 Id. at 451. 
6 Id. at 447. 
7 David Turns, The “War on Terror” Through British and International Humanitarian Law Eyes: 
Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 435, 469 (2007). 
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belligerent occupation, and because of the military capabilities of modern terrorist 
organizations.8 Turns suggests that this opinion seems to have been intended to have a 
wider applicability outside of Israel and in other state-terrorist armed conflicts.9 Scholar 
Sasha Radin mentions discomfort with the application of the rules of international armed 
conflict, as the War on Terror spans multiple states, which can lead to defining this 
conflict as a global conflict.10 Part of the issue is defining the enemy, before one can 
determine that the actions of that enemy, in combination across various states, amounts to 
the level of intensity required for international armed conflict, and therefore LOAC to 
apply. 
In 2001 when the AUMF was passed, our enemies were, broadly, those who could 
be tied to the groups directly responsible for the September 11 attacks. In 2001, it seemed 
clearer that the enemy was Al-Qaeda and its affiliated forces, and the Taliban. Today, as 
the core of Al-Qaeda has been deteriorated by U.S. operations, the Taliban is no longer in 
power, and many related, but un-affiliated terrorist factions are popping up in many 
countries, it is more difficult to assess who were are exactly fighting. The identity of Al-
Qaeda was built in the idea that modern, western society was a threat to Islam, and the 
Islamic world needed to protect itself. Specifically, Lawrence Wright describes in The 
Looming Tower that angst against the West increased when Egyptians used torture 
against their Islamic prisoners, creating a thirst for revenge against a West seen as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Id. at 470 (discussing the opinion in HCJ 769/02, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of 
Israel [2006] at 18). 
9 Id. at 472. 
10 Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 696, 670 (2013). 
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backing the Egyptian regime.11 The protection of Islam against the West is the main basis 
for affiliated and non-affiliated factions of Al-Qaeda in various countries.  
One problem in defining these groups is the fact that the definition of terrorism is 
unsettled. Nicholas Perry, an attorney in the Department of Homeland Security, writes 
that over 150 scholarly and legal definitions of terrorism exist, with no consensus.12 He 
reviews the different scholarly definitions of terrorism, stating that twenty-two different 
elements exist in scholars’ definitions, including the terms violence or force, political, 
fear, or terror, and a political purpose or motivation among the most common.13 Perry 
states that one of the difficulties in creating one accepted definition of terrorism is the 
changing nature of terrorism, and not knowing what a prospective terrorist may do next.14 
Besides the unsuccessful attempts by scholars to create a single definition of terorrism, 
the U.S. federal government also has created nineteen different definitions or descriptions 
of terrorism, and three terms relating to the support of terrorism in federal law.15 
Besides not being able to clearly identify the enemy, Wright mentions that Al-
Qaeda further discredits the use of international human rights law because the values that 
America considered universally desirable, such as the rule of law and human rights, were 
Western, modern ideas that were a threat a Islam.16 Therefore, one side of this armed 
conflict, terrorist groups, refuses to abide by international humanitarian law, making the 
conflict even more difficult to define and set any appropriate boundaries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 52 (Random House LLC 2006). 
12 Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many 
Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249 (2004). 
13 Id. at 251. 
14 Id. at 252. 
15 Id. at 255. 
16 WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 172. 
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What is clear, however, is that the United States finds itself at war, and rules need 
to be defined so as to balance national security concerns with civil liberties and human 
rights. Itzhak Zamir, professor of law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and former 
attorney general of Israel suggested that the judicial system gives greater preference to 
national security concerns over those of human rights when discussing the conflict 
between national security and human rights.17 Zamir explains that is the reason security 
always wins out in the judicial system over issues of liberty and human rights.18 Even in 
the late 80s, Zamir suggests taking a broad view of national interest that includes other 
rights besides security, and points out that in no other area of law can breaches be so 
grave by claiming that the task justifies the means, and by placing actions under the cloak 
of security until the term is used to an extreme to jeopardize law and human rights.19 
Although Zamir was writing 25 years ago, the importance of his discussion of the 
improper use of emergency war powers in a prolonged war are still true today.20 it is the 
lawmakers, in his belief, that must restrain the authorities in order to protect human rights 
and limit unlimited power with security issues.21 Similarly, Justice Dbe of the Court of 
Appeals of England and Wales believes that the legislature has the greatest opportunity to 
restrain the executive because even the courts must defer to the legislature’s view that 
laws that infringe on an individual’s liberties for the sake of national security were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375 (1989). 
18 Id. at 377. 
19 Id. at 378 – 380 (“[O]ne must not regard national security as the only national interest, though it may 
well be a crucial one.”). 
20 Id. at 382-83. 
21 Id. at 384-92. 
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needed, and the court further respects the fact that the executive is also exercising his 
rights in using that legislation to protect his citizens.22  
Even in the late 80s could Zamir forsee the security debate in the United States in 
2014, writing that those authorities that are responsible for a country’s security use their 
full power and benefits of security secrecy to provide maximum security without striking 
an appropriate balance to human rights or other interests.23 However, in American war-
time history, today’s derogations from human rights are not unique. Jack Goldsmith in 
The Terror Presidency compares today’s expansion of executive power to provide 
maximum security to the claims of power made by other war-time presidents, including 
Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt.24 In Lincoln’s time, Goldsmith writes, Lincoln 
interpreted his duty to defend and preserve the constitution as including preserving the 
government by any means, including unconstitutional means that might become lawful if 
done to preserve the constitution, and therefore the nation.25 Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor made the same comparisons in 2008, mentioning President 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Judiciary’s ruling in ExParte 
Milligan.26 These comparisons to history are important because it shows how today’s 
conflict isn’t something new, and changing rules during war is both necessary and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Justice Arden Dbe, Balancing Human Rights and National Security, 124 S. AFRICAN L.J. 57, 60 (2007). 
23 Zamir, supra note 17, at 381. 
24 Jack Goldsmith, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 8, 48, 83-84(W.W. Norton & Company, 2007) (describing the 
duties Roosevelt and Lincoln felt to protecting the nation and using extralegal means to do so under their 
Presidential emergency powers) [hereinafter TERROR PRESIDENCY]. 
25 Id. at 83. 
26 Sandra Day O’Connor, Balancing Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in an Age of Terrorism, 47, 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 6, 6-7 (2008-09); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (holding that military tribunals 
cannot be used to try civilians suspected of aiding the Confederacy as long as traditional civilian courts 
were open and functioning.). 
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common. Of course, today’s human rights regime is far more robust that it was during 
either Lincoln or Roosevelt’s time, and the sense of emergency was clearer for the public 
then than it is today. A decision like Korematsu v. United States, would likely not happen 
today, nor would that decision be used today, for example.27  
 Rose Brooks, a Law Professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, writes 
that the reason human rights and the protection of liberties have been eroding in U.S. 
national security policy is due to the muddling of definitions in the laws of war.28 She 
asserts that the definitions of what is a national security issues versus a domestic issue, or 
what is war and what is peace are no longer simple distinctions to make in the war on 
terror and these traditional legal categories are no longer tenable.29 She argues that the 
breakdown of clear distinctions is what has allowed the United States to make domestic 
policy that infringes on international human rights and the laws of war by placing more 
and more decisions under the guise of national security to which the courts subject far 
less scrutiny on the government than in other issues.30 Jack Goldsmith re-iterated the lack 
of scrutiny of the courts by pointing out that legal interpretation in national security 
doesn’t equate to judicial interpretation.31 In fact, the executive branch has far fewer 
institutional constraints, “where the President’s superior information and quite different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that national security concerns demanded that 
American citizens of Japanese ancestry could be segregated and interned temporarily). 
28 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed 
Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004). 
29 Id. at 677 . 
30 Id. at 676-77, 682 (“As traditional categories lose their logical underpinnings, we are entering a new era: 
the era of War Everywhere. It is an era in which the legal rules that were designed to protect basic rights 
and vulnerable groups have lost much of their analytical force, and thus, too often, their practical force.”). 
31 TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 24, at 35. 
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responsibilities foster a unique perspective” outside of the judicial system.32 This power 
comes with concerns, however, as Goldsmith acknowledges that the President’s control 
over the military and intelligence agencies, his ability to act in secret, and the work of his 
legal staff in defining his powers as the President sees fit create opportunities for abuse.33 
However, in a later book, Goldsmith describes the legal constraints that have built up 
since 9/11 on Presidential power and the legitimacy that congress and the courts have 
brought to executive actions in national security.34 Goldsmith highlights these constraints 
in explaining that even in the days after 9/11, the Congress limited the president’s power 
in passing the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in September 2001 
because the President had asked for much wider leverage to go after groups who were not 
even associated with the attacks of 9/11.35  
Brooks points out that in other contexts, human rights groups have called for 
flexible interpretations of international law, but in the national security context call for 
more rigid and strict interpretations when assessing U.S. policy in the war on terror.36 
These groups have asserted that the loosening of the definitions in the laws of war for 
national security purposes has eroded the protection of human rights. Brooks describes 
the blurring of definition as creating a slippery slope that undermines other legal 
practices, and gives the example of the Bush administration determining that Geneva 
Conventions cannot apply and concluding that therefore, there were no legal constraints 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 183. 
34 Jack Goldsmith, POWER AND CONSTRAINT (W.W. Norton & Company, 2012) [hereinafter POWER AND 
CONSTRAINT] 
35 Id. at 183. 
36 Brooks, supra note 28, at 680. 
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on interrogation, when in fact other laws prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment of detainees.37 Although Brooks determines that the human rights 
framework is outdated, in her application of human rights laws to U.S. domestic national 
security laws such as the PATRIOT Act, Brooks determines that the United States seems 
to have run afoul of many norms of international law.38 She sees a larger role for courts to 
intervene and apply human rights law when building a larger paradigm for dealing with 
the war on terror.39 Brooks therefore determines that the old laws of war need to be 
replaced by a new, more protective system to deal with changes in the new conflict and 
threat of the 21st century.40 I will provide such examples of possible changes later in this 
paper.  
 When applying the laws of war to the war on terror, many scholars agree that the 
law of armed conflict applies and is the best legal framework to place the war on terror.41 
William Taft, a legal advisor for the Department of State in 2003, agrees that the laws of 
war are most appropriate to regulate the war on terror, and although stresses have been 
placed on the laws of war, Taft believes that the basic framework of the laws of war have 
remained strong since 9/11 and do not need revision or amendment.42 Professor Jordan 
Paust agrees, stating that there is no need to revise the Geneva Conventions because of 
the 9/11 attacks, and doing so in order to change the status of detained individuals or Al-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. at 682-83. 
38 Id. at 749-50. 
39 Id. at 685-86. 
40 Id. at 684. 
41 Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 325 
(2003); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, International Law and the War on Terrorism, 1-2, available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/yoonyucombatants.pdf. 
42 William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 
319 (2003). 
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Qaeda members is not only legally inappropriate but would have “seriously harmful 
consequences.”43 
Many scholars, however, grapple with the gaps present in today’s human rights 
regime, and how to amend international law to deal with today’s war and address those 
gaps. James Stewart wrote in 2003 that the best way to deal with today’s 
internationalized conflicts is to create one single law of armed conflict and remove the 
distinctions between international and internal conflicts.44 He believes this leaves a gap in 
the law of armed conflict where different rules would apply in each situation.45 Removing 
the distinctions applies the law to all conflicts, which is especially important in today’s 
globalized world that increases incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts.46 
Stewart writes that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions became inapplicable in 
“armed conflicts not of an international character” and only applicable when the intensity 
of hostilities reaches “protracted armed violence”, leaving governments to define for 
themselves what those terms mean.47 The lack of definition in Common Article 3 leaves 
many gaps in protections that were never filled with the Additional Protocols.48 The 
three-pronged test that exists today to determine whether hostilities are of an international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Paust, supra note 41, at 328, 335 (“Acceptance of [claims to change the laws of war] would result in 
changing the status of war, modifying thresholds for application of the laws of war, redefining “combatant” 
status, as well as refusing to grant prisoner of war status to members of the armed forces of a party to an 
international armed conflict. Were such changes to be made, serious consequences could ensue for the 
United States, other countries, U.S. military personnel, military personnel of other countries, and the rest of 
humankind.”). 
44 James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International humanitarian Law: A 
Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 316. 
47 Id. at 318. 
48 Id. at 319-21. 
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character is not applied consistently, and is confusing to apply in the midst of hostilities, 




















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Id. at 327-28, 333. 
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Introduction 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States entered 
into a flurry of law and policy decisions to set in place a system to prevent further attacks 
and stop the spread of terrorism. During this process, the United States has had 
obligations under international law that required it to follow principles of international 
human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). These obligations 
also extend to persons held at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.50 
Most notably, the United States is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), and the Geneva Conventions. These treaties and conventions can be understood 
through various binding and non-binding sources, such as the United Nations Human 
Rights Council general comments, secondary sources such as Amnesty International, 
International Court decisions, United Nations working group resolutions, Human Rights 
Committee comments, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
Through these interpretations, we can determine whether U.S. policy in the realm of 
national security comports with U.S. obligations under IHRL and IHL. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The Human Rights Committee, the body in charge of implementing the ICCPR, has stated that “a State 
party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State party.” Economic and Social 
Council, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Report of the Chairperson Rapporteur of the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Leila Zerrougui; the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers, Leandro Despouy; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, Manji-ed Nowak; the Special Rapporteur on Feedom of religion or belief, Asma 
Jahangir; and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/120, (Feb. 27, 2006), para. 11, 
quoting Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10 
[hereinafter Situation of Detainees]. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine four areas of U.S. national security 
policy, namely surveillance, detention, interrogation, and targeted killings, and determine 
the legality of U.S. operations in these areas under IHRL and IHL. First, I will briefly 
discuss the differences between the two bodies of law, and when each applies as I will be 
applying them throughout the paper. Then, for each section I will identify the domestic 
and international law that governs the legality of those operations, and will analyze the 
legality of the operations under IHRL and IHL. I will conclude the paper with discussion 
of how IHRL and IHL impacted the creation of U.S. national security policy in these 
areas, if at all. I will then briefly assess compliance between administrations to determine 
whether the United States is moving toward or away from compliance with international 
law. Finally, I will offer some prescriptions on amending international human rights and 
humanitarian laws to better deal with the War on Terror. I will offer clearer and more 
restrictive guidelines to increase protections, as this type of war was not imagined at the 
time of writing of these international laws, making coverage of this war by international 
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Human Rights Law v. Humanitarian Law 
International human rights law creates obligations that states must refrain from 
interfering with human rights, and protect individuals and groups against human rights 
abuses.51 The foundation for IHRL is found in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights drafted in 1948, and is supplemented by a series of international human rights 
treaties and other instruments.52    
Also known as the law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law seeks to 
limit the means and methods of warfare for humanitarian reasons.53 Specifically, IHL 
protects those who are not, or are no longer participating in the fighting, and places 
restrictions on weapons and military tactics.54 A major part of IHL is contained the 
Geneva Conventions, and supplemented by further agreements.55 
 
When each law applies 
As described by the International Court of Justice, the relationship between IHRL 
and IHL in terms of armed conflict is that some things fall just under IHRL, and some fall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx. 
52 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx; Int’l Comm. for the Red Cross, 
IHL and Human Rights Law (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-
regmies/ihl-human-rights/overview-ihl-and-human-rights.htm [hereinafter ICRC IHL, IHRL] 
53 Int’l Comm. for the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law? (2004), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf [hereinafter ICRC IHL]; UNHC Legal 
Protection, supra note 2, at 1. 
54 ICRC IHL, supra note 53. 
55 The Geneva Conventions are supplemented by the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the protection 
of victims of armed conflicts, and other agreements that prohibit the use of certain weapons and military 
tactics and that protect people and goods. Id.; ICRC IHL, IHRL, supra note 52. 
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just under IHL, and some matters fall under both sets of laws.56 Both IHRL and IHL bind 
state and non-state actors.57 
IHRL applies at all times as customary international law, and always prevails 
during peacetime and during public emergencies that fall short of armed conflict.58 IHRL 
allows for some derogations, while IHL can never be derogated from.59  
IHL applies only to armed conflict once it has begun, and does not cover internal, 
isolated acts of violence.60 IHL binds all actors to an armed conflict, whether they are 
state or non-state actors, and includes individuals.61 It binds governments, and groups 
fighting against or among themselves.62 
 
Can they apply concurrently? 
The U.S. has wrongly indicated in some situations during armed conflict, such as 
in the detention of enemy combatants, that only humanitarian law would apply.63 In fact, 
the UN High Commissioner, the International Committee for the Red Cross, the General 
Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Human Rights Council have all 
acknowledged that both IHRL and IHL do apply concurrently, during times of armed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Palestinian Wall, Advisory Op., 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106. 
57 UNHC Legal Protection, supra note 2, at 24. 
58 Int’l Comm. Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: 
Similarities and Differences, Advisory Service (Jan 2003) [hereinafter ICRC Advisory] 
59 ICRC IHL, IHRL, supra note 52. 
60 ICRC IHL, supra note 53; ICRC Advisory, supra note 58. 
61 ICRC Advisory, supra note 58. 
62 Id. 
63 Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures--Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, 41 I.L.M. 1015, 1019 (2002) (“It is humanitarian law, and not human rights law, that governs the 
capture and detention of enemy combatants in armed conflict.”). 
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conflict.64 That is because IHRL also applies to acts of a state acting in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its territory.65 In the times when both laws apply, the IHL specific 
norm prevails when there is a more general IHRL norm.66 If there is an absence of 
standard in IHL, then the IHRL provision would govern in those situations.  
IHL does not always prevail over IHRL, however. If an IHRL norm sets a higher 
bar, then that standard is adopted instead of the IHL standard.67 For example, Article 72 
of the Geneva Protocol I states that its provisions of IHL are additional to IHRL, and 
Article 75 makes it clear that if IHRL offers more protection, then the convention should 
only act as a minimum protection, and is never meant to limit any international law that 
offers greater protection.68 Therefore, in times of armed conflict when IHL applies, a 
person would be entitled to benefit from a more favorable provision in IHRL, if one 
exists. The two laws act simultaneously. This is especially necessary in a conflict with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 UNHC Legal Protection, supra note 2, at 5-6; ICRC IHL, IHRL, supra note 52; Annual Report of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights For Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High 
Commissioner and the Secretary-General, 11th session, para. 5, A/HRC/11/31 (June 4, 2009) (“The High 
Commissioner recalled that, over the years, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and, 
more recently, the Human Rights Council had expressed the view that, in situations of armed conflict, 
parties to the conflict had legally binding obligations concerning the rights of persons affected by the 
conflict…. the Council also acknowledged that human rights law and international humanitarian law were 
complimentary and mutually reinforcing.”); G.A. Res. 10/2013, para. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/WGAD/2013/10 (June 12, 2013) (Opinion concerning Mr. Obaidullah); Additionally, the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated in an opinion that it “would like to stress as a matter of 
principle that the application of international humanitarian law to an international or non-international 
armed conflict does not exclude application of human rights law. The two bodies of law are complimentary 
and not mutually exclusive.” UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3/2009 (United 
States of America), A/HRC/13/30/Add.1 at 259(2010), para. 30. 
65 UNHC Legal Protection, supra note 2, at 43. 
66 Id. at 58; UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3/2009 (United States of America), 
A/HRC/13/30/Add.1 at 259(2010), para. 30 (“In the case of a conflict between the provisions of the two 
legal regimes with regard to a specific situation, the lex specialis will have to be identified and applied.”). 
67 Douglass Cassel, Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints 
Under International Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 820 (2008). 
68 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 arts. 72, 75.1, 75.8, reprinted 
in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
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non-state actors in which IHL binds both state and non-state actors, while IHRL 
traditionally only binds state actors. 
In various general comments, the Human Rights Committee, as well as the 
International Court of Justice, have stated that the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) has applied during armed conflicts while IHL was applicable.69 
The Human Rights Council has also acknowledged that IHL and IHRL are 
complimentary and mutually reinforcing in resolution 9/9.70 Additionally, in IHRL 
treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, derogations from certain human rights, subject to 
limitations, are permitted during times of armed conflict.71 If both laws were not meant to 
apply at the same time, there would be no need for these express provisions allowing for 
derogation. The Convention Against Torture is also meant to apply simultaneously with 
IHL, since it prohibits torture even in a “state of war”.72 An example of a treaty that has 
explicit provisions applicable to both peace and war situations is the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, an IHRL treaty.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See general comments No. 29 (2001) on states of emergency (Art. 4), para. 3, and 31 (2004) on the 
nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 11; UNHC Legal 
Protection, supra note 2, at 55 (“[T]he protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war”). 
70 Human Rights Council, Resolution 9/9 Protection of the Human Rights of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 1, 
A-HRC-RES-9-9, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/events/HR_civilians_aconflict/docs/A-HRC-RES-9-
9.pdf. 
71 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 232, art. 15.1; American Convention on Human Rights Organization of American 
States Treaty, Nov. 22, 1969, B-32, O.A.S.T.S. 36, art. 27(1). 
72 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Art. 2.2, 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100.20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war...may be invoked as a justification of torture.”) [hereinafter UN 
CAT] 
73 UNHC Legal Protection, supra note 2, at 56 (“States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect 
for rules of international humanitarian law”). 
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Surveillance 
The rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and association are fundamental 
human rights recognized under international law. Programs that surveil individuals and 
collect their communications data threaten these rights. With the dramatic increase in 
communications content and internet traffic in recent years, the opportunity for 
intelligence collection is enormous, and U.S. policy has been intent on reducing barriers 
to that information, at the cost of individual privacy, all in the name of national security.  
 
Main Surveillance Programs & Domestic Surveillance Authority 
 
Call Records Program 
 One of the main data collection programs run by the National Security Agency is 
the collection of daily phone business records from major phone service companies. 
These business records contain metadata from named individuals, including the numbers 
dialed, and the call’s time and duration.74 The information being collected does not 
include content. However, metadata is still extremely revealing of the details of an 
individual’s personal life. Putting details from metadata together from prolonged 
surveillance creates a clear picture of an individual’s private life, and can show patterns 
of their daily activities and associations. In the 2012 Supreme Court decision U.S. v. 
Jones, the Court recognized that continuous electronic surveillance for an extended 
period of time implicates the Fourth Amendment.75 Five justices even acknowledged that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Verizon Forced to Hand Over Telephone Data – Full Court Ruling, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order.  
75 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
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this type of continuous surveillance intrudes into reasonable expectations of privacy.76 
Further, the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance considers metadata collection to be extremely intrusive, 
stating that the systematic collection and storage of information about identities, 
interactions, and location creates a full picture of everything a person does, and reveals a 
lot about their private life.77 
However, the government bases its legal justification for the collection of 
‘telephony metadata’ on the 1979 case, Smith v. Maryland.78 In Smith, the Supreme Court 
held that Americans have no expectation of privacy if they give their information to a 
third party and the information is held as business records.79 The case draws a distinction 
between call ‘metadata’ and content. But with the advances in technology today, it is 
questionable whether a 1979 precedent can still be used as legal justification for such 
expanded surveillance that did not exist at the time of Smith v. Maryland. 
PRISM Program 
 Leaked documents also show the existence of a program aptly named PRISM that 
collects digital data in bulk from the nation’s largest internet companies, including 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo among others.80 The program collects records directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954-64 (See concurring opinions of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito with whom 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined). 
77 International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (July 
2013) available at https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text#_edn3. 
78 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
79 Id. at 744.  
80 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet 
Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.  
	   20	  
from the central servers of these companies and is focused on foreign internet traffic. 
This information includes contact lists, buddy lists, and geolocation information of 
hundreds of thousands of people daily.81 Much like ‘telephony metadata’, this data would 
allow the NSA to develop patterns of a person’s personal life and associations. The 
government is then able to look through information two hops out from the initial target 
of the query, without acquiring any additional warrant for those additional individuals. It 
is reported that the NSA relies on the PRISM collection program as its main source for 
raw information, “accounting for nearly 1 in 7 intelligence reports”.82 The government 
finds its legal basis for this program in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
Amendments of 2008. Before enactment of the Amendments, FISA required the 
government to obtain an individualized order that identified or described the target of the 
surveillance, contained “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”, 
explained the government’s basis for believing that “each of the facilities or places at 
which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”, listed the minimization procedures the 
government had in place to reduce the collection of information of U.S. persons, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-
mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.; Barton 
Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-
cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-
c6ca94801fac_story.html?hpid=z1(According to the government, the reasoning behind the geolocation data 
collection program is to “look for unknown associated of known intelligence targets by tracking people 
whose movements intersect”). 
82 NSA Tracking, supra note 81. 
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specified the nature of the foreign intelligence information sought and the types of 
communications that would be subject to surveillance, and certified that a “significant 
purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain “foreign intelligence information.”83 The 2008 
Amendments do not require the government to specify a particular target at all, or 
whether or not they are a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. The government 
is further no longer required to list what types of communications will be subject to 
surveillance, which allows for a broad order that allows surveillance of various types of 
communications, like emails and phone lines, without getting a new order each time.84 
Most importantly, the 2008 Amendments change the “significant purpose” requirement to 
attach to entire surveillance programs instead of any individual target.85  
The FISA Court 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was established under the FISA in 
1978 as a special court of seven federal district court judges to review government 
applications for warrants related to national security investigations.86 The act also created 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) to review the decisions of 
the FISC at the request of the government.87 The court only hears argument from the 
government ex parte, so there is no adversary party that is a part of the proceedings.88 
Surveillance requests submitted by the government are granted 99.97 percent of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2010). 
84 50 U.S.C. § 1881. 
85 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v). 
86 50 U.S.C. § 1803; Federal judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html.  
87 History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 86.  
88 Legislation has been put forward to include an adversarial process in the FISC proceedings. H.R. Res. 
3159, 113th Cong. (2013) (as referred to committee on Sep. 20, 2013) available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3159. 
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time.89 Some dub the court a ‘rubber stamp’, but the court and its supporters in the 
government have pushed back on this claim. In March 2009, the court took the unusual 
step of ordering the government to seek approval to query the database on a case-by-case 
basis “except where necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human life.”90 
Further, in an Oct 3, 2011 opinion, the FISA court struck down an NSA program that 
gathered tens of thousands of internet communications between Americans. The court 
held that the “upstream collection” of communication was “deficient on statutory and 
constitutional grounds” because some of the data is “wholly unrelated to the tasked 
selector”.91 The opinion states that based on NSA estimates, the government was 
gathering approximately 2,000-10,000 solely domestic communications every year.92 
However, the Court did find that the vast majority of the collection conducted by the 
NSA complied with targeting and minimization procedures.93 The opinion was 
declassified in August 2013.   
 Despite the minor checks on government surveillance, the FISC has repeatedly 
approved the government’s bulk data collection programs. In a declassified August 29, 
2013 order, The FISC found the collection of business records, or telephone metadata, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89Kennedy Elliot & Terri Rupar, Six Months of Revelations on NSA, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nsa-timeline/. 
90 Ellen Nakashima et al., Declassified Court Documents Highlight NSA Violations in Data Collection for 
Surveillance, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/declassified-court-documents-highlight-nsa-violations/2013/09/10/60b5822c-1a4b-11e3-a628-
7e6dde8f889d_story.html.  
91 FISA Court Ruling on Illegal NSA E-mail Collection Program, at 2-5, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-
program/409/.  
92 Id. at 33. 
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be constitutional under both the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and under 
section 215 of the USA PARTIOT Act.94 The FISC relied on Smith v Maryland to uphold 
the program’s constitutionality under the fourth amendment, stating the third party 
doctrine.95 The order requires that the process to query the data include a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the phone number being searched is associated with one of the 
identified international terrorist organizations.96 The Court also requires adequate 
minimization procedures, and a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to believe 
that tangible things sought are relevant to the investigation.97 The court also limited the 
government’s use of the collected data by prohibiting the government from accessing the 
data for any other intelligence or investigative purpose.98 However, although the material 
does have to be relevant, the government asserts that it is impossible to know where 
exactly the relevant information will be found. The government defended its broad use of 
the relevancy requirement in a white paper release in August of 2013, asserting that 
relevance “is a broad standard that permits the discovery of large volumes of data. . . 
because there are reasonable grounds to believe that this category of data . . . will produce 
information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism . . .”.99   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Docket Number BR 13-109, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf [hereinafter FISC opinion]. 
95 Id. at 6-7; The third party doctrine: once a person has transmitted their numerical information to a third 
party, such as the phone company, then the person no longer has a “legitimate expectation of privacy in 
[the] information”. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
96 United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Docket Number BR 13-109, at 5, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary. 
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PATRIOT Act, at 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at 
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 Although the FISA Court has continuously held that the phone metadata 
collection program is legal, Federal District Court Judge Richard Leon ruled in December 
of 2013 that the daily collection of almost all phone records of Americans is 
unconstitutional. He based his decision upon the fourth amendment right to privacy, and 
the query and analysis of information without prior judicial approval.100 It remains to be 
seen how far in the judicial process this ruling will go, and if the Supreme Court will rule 
on the legality of the phone collection program. 
 
Legality of Surveillance under IHRL & IHL 
 During opening remarks at the 24th annual Human Rights Council meeting in 
Geneva, UN Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay articulated a widespread concern across 
human rights scholars “over the broad scope of security surveillance regimes in countries 
including the United States . . . and the potential for intrusion on individuals’ privacy 
which have been made possible by modern communications technology”.101 The right to 
privacy is protected under various human rights documents, including Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),102 and Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).103 The United States ratified the ICCPR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Klayman v. Obama, D.D.C. No.13-0881 (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/klayman_v._obama.pdf.  
101 Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement at the Human 
Rights Council 24th Session (Sep. 9, 2013), available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13687&LangID=E. 
102 UDHR, supra note 51, Art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
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in 1992, and is therefore required to abide by all of its provisions, including Article 17, 
the right to privacy. Even the rights of privacy of children are specifically protected by 
Article 16 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.104 Further, violations of the 
right to privacy create a chilling effect on the rights of association and expression that 
amount to violations when the government collects mass communications data that can 
provide a window into an individual’s life through their daily interactions. Although there 
is no UN Special Mandate protecting the right to privacy, Frank LaRue, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, affirms that “privacy and 
freedom of expression are interlinked and mutually dependent; an infringement upon one 
can be both the cause and consequence of an infringement upon the other.”105 These 
rights are also protected by the UDHR by Articles 19 and 20,106 and in the ICCPR by 
Articles 19 and 22.107 In a July 2012 resolution, the Human Rights Council affirmed that 
human rights should also be protected in the digital world, because the same rights people 
have offline must also be protected online.108  
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 The scope of the ICCPR Article 17 right to privacy can be interpreted through UN 
reports, comments, and international principles, such as the International Principles on 
the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, more commonly 
known as the Necessary and Proportionate Principles. According to the Necessary and 
Proportionate Principles relied on as a guide by hundreds of organizations, privacy is a 
fundamental human right and surveillance can only be justified when it is “prescribed by 
law, they are necessary to achieve a legitimate aim, and are proportionate to the aim 
pursued.”109 Further, although the FISA has given the government almost complete free 
reign to collect foreign communications, the Necessary and Proportionate Principles 
recognizes that the United States has obligations to uphold the privacy rights of foreign 
individuals as well.110 In the case of U.S. surveillance policy, the programs are prescribed 
by law and found constitutional by a court (although, it is questionable whether a secret 
court provides proper judicial oversight), and work toward combating terrorism, a 
legitimate aim. However, the broad scope of the respective surveillance programs and 
their intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment of U.S. citizens are cause to question whether 
the policy is proportionate to the aim of combating terrorism. Human Rights Committee 
1994 General Comments specify that the right to privacy is guaranteed whether it 
emanates from a State or a person, and is intended to prevent both unlawful and arbitrary 
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109 International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (July 
2013) available at https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text#_edn3 (list of supporting organizations 
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interference.111 Therefore, even if the United States Congress, the FISA Court, and the 
regular U.S. Court system uphold the surveillance laws as legal and constitutional, and 
those laws are legal under international human rights standards, there still remains an 
inquiry as to whether the interference is arbitrary. “Arbitrary intrusion” can extend to 
interference that is provided by law, and the only information that can be collected of an 
individual’s private life is “knowledge of which is essential in the interests of society”.112 
Various human rights documents and opinions, as described below, consider information 
relating to national security and combating terrorism as information that is of essential 
interest.  
Further, the Committee requires that information be made available by the State 
on its conformity to the surveillance laws of actual practice and that there be means for 
individuals to make complaints if their rights under Article 17 of the Covenant have been 
violated.113 The United States is in violation of both of these requirements. Even after a 
large amount of declassification of classified documents in the summer of 2013, the 
public is still not aware of the full extent of the law’s application and the State’s 
conformity to the law. Much of that information remains classified for national security 
purposes. Further, when the government collects information under a FISA, it remains 
secret and is impossible to defend against in a court of law. Therefore, there is no 
available means to contest or complain to the State of a rights violation. The same general 
comments also prohibits electronic surveillance, interceptions of telephonic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Human Rights Committee General Comment 16, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Bodies, 23rd Sess., 1988, U.N. Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 
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communication, wire-tapping, and recording of conversations.114 However, I believe this 
is where the exceptions outlined in the ICCPR for restrictions of liberties for a legitimate 
national security aim would take precedence. Although the general comments mentions 
prohibiting electronic surveillance, there is more than enough documentation countering 
this that would allow surveillance as long as it is proportionate to the aim of countering 
terrorism or other national security aims. The General Comments adopted in 1994 are 
outdated in this regard. Another concern mentioned in the general comments 
understanding of Article 17 is the holding of personal information, and making sure it is 
not accessed by unauthorized persons.115 Violations of this provision have been 
uncovered, as a February 2009 report of NSA operations found that over 200 analysts at 
various agencies had access to query results that did not properly mask the identities of 
U.S. persons.116 In Escher v. Brazil, the Court also determined that the accessing of 
personal, private information outside of a lawful criminal investigation, and sharing of 
that information with unauthorized parties is a violation of the right to Privacy.117 
 The scope of the United States’ obligation under international law to protect the 
right to privacy has also been outlined in reports released by Special Rapporteur LaRue in 
2011 and 2013. In the 2011 Human Rights Council report, LaRue defines the scope of 
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Article 17 of the ICCPR by defining the word correspondence in the Article to include all 
forms of communication, including internet communication, and therefore concludes that 
communication should be protected from any interference or inspection by state agencies 
or third parties.118 The report also stresses the necessity to create data protection laws that 
stipulate who is allowed to access personal data, what it can be used for, how it should be 
stored, and for how long.119 The United States does have some of these regulations in 
place. A subsequent report was released in 2013 that reiterated concerns with mass 
surveillance, and highlighted the need to consider technological advances in 
communications when developing or revising surveillance laws so that they better 
comport with human rights laws.120 This concern is legitimate when considering the 
programs run by the United States that have their legal basis in Supreme Court cases and 
legislation from the late 1970s. The third party doctrine was created at a time when 
facebook, google, yahoo, and smartphones were far from development, yet this doctrine, 
solidified by Smith v. Maryland,121 still holds today. An individual’s expectation of 
privacy under the third party doctrine has changed with new developments in technology 
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as Justice Sotomayor suggested in her concurrence in U.S. v. Jones, and the surveillance 
laws should be amended to reflect those changes.  
The National Security exceptions 
 Written into the ICCPR are exceptions to barring infringement on certain liberties 
if there is a legitimate national security aim. The rights to freedom of expression and 
freedom of association are restricted in this way, but the right to privacy is not. Under the 
ICCPR, these rights can be restricted “for the protection of national security” under 
Article 19, or if “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety” under Article 22.122 The Convention on the Rights of the Child even 
recognizes exceptions to the same rights under Articles 13 and 15.123  
The 2011 Special Rapporteur report released by the Human Rights Council also 
notes that some human rights can be subject to some limitations under exceptional 
circumstances. In fact, the report further mentions “State surveillance measures for the 
purpose[] of . . . combating terrorism” as an appropriate exception.124 However, to be 
legal under human rights laws, there must be a law that clearly outlines the restriction on 
the right to privacy, there must be a specific decision, preferably by a court, that allows 
the law to encroach on the right to privacy, and must respect the principle of 
proportionality.125 The FISA laws and the USA PATRIOT Act do outline the restrictions 
on the right to privacy, although it is questionable how clearly the laws were understood 
by the American people at the time of their passage. Those laws have been interpreted by 
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the Government to restrict rights to privacy immensely, and the FISC has approved these 
laws and found them to be constitutional, including the administration’s interpretation of 
the scope of the surveillance.126 However, these definitions and opinions are not all 
public, and data on the success of the programs is not fully known to properly assess their 
proportionality to the threat. A 2013 report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression also recognizes that “concerns about national security 
[…] may justify the exceptional use of communications surveillance technologies”, 
however inadequate laws regulating what surveillance is necessary create the opportunity 
for unlawful infringements on the right to privacy, and also “threaten the protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression”.127 Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, has also recognized that national security concerns justify the exceptional 
use of surveillance, but that adequate safeguards should be put into pace to protect 
government overreach and to protect human rights.128  
Therefore, State surveillance for the purpose of national security in itself is legal 
under human rights law, but the proportionality of the programs to the threat is 
questionable. For example, when State surveillance efforts, justified under the scope of 
national security, are used to collect evidence of non-national security related crimes, and 
introduced as evidence in court, ex parte, this is a violation of both international and 
domestic laws. Additionally, when the government can pinpoint only one situation in 
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which the surveillance programs were a major cause of disruption, but not a but-for cause 
to stopping an attack on the homeland, it further stretches the government’s claim of 
necessity for this amount of mass surveillance.129 Other programs working in tandem 
with the mass data collection programs did just as much work in disrupting plots on the 
homeland.130 The mass surveillance programs leaked in the summer of 2013 have yet to 
receive a full review of legality by the Human Rights Commission.131 
 
Surveillance of U.S. Citizens 
 United States citizens have protections beyond international law from State 
surveillance activity. The U.S. Constitution under the Fourth Amendment protects the 
right to privacy, and protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, including 
searching of communications data, and storing the data for many years. A search occurs 
when the government infringes on an individual’s expectation of privacy.132 In her 
concurring opinion in U.S. v Jones, Justice Sotomayor agreed that even the metadata 
information being collected by the surveillance programs should fall under Fourth 
Amendment protection by writing, "[p]eople disclose the phone numbers that they dial or 
text to their cellular providers, the URLS that they visit and the e-mail addresses with 
which they correspond to their Internet service providers, and the books, groceries and 
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medications they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection."133 The Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper, has acknowledged in a letter to Senator Wyden in 2014 that 
the NSA has searched its large amount of data specifically for the communications of 
Americans without warrants.134 Clapper did not mention how many Americans were 
searched without a warrant. 
State surveillance is legal under international law, and the domestic surveillance 
laws do require that a warrant be sought for any query into a target’s information. 
However, one query allows the government to search 2 hops away from the target, which 
can catch millions of Americans under one warrant.135 The Fourth Amendment is meant 
to prevent dragnet surveillance by requiring law enforcement to go to courts and show 
probable cause.136 Generalized warrants of this type are illegal, and in violation of a 
citizen’s fourth amendment rights.137 Under the surveillance laws, individualized 
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warrants are not necessary if the target is reasonably believed to be a non-U.S. person.138 
However, the way the government decides who is a foreign person is not very reassuring. 
The United States bases its analysis on a “totality of the circumstances” approach, 
looking at information about the target such as the location of the facilities they use to 
communicate or other information that identifies the target, looking at any information in 
their databases about the target’s location, and by looking at IP addresses and telephone 
codes.139 These procedures can create false identification as a foreign person, especially 
when the government only has to have 51% confidence that the target is a foreign person 
before they are treated as such.140 There are other targeting procedures in place as well, 
including matching the target to a database of electronic accounts that are believed to be 
used by U.S. persons, but without specific information suggesting the target is a U.S. 
person, they are treated as foreign.141  
To minimize the incidental collection of American data, the government also has 
to abide by certain minimization procedures under Section 702 of the FISA. The NSA is 
required under Section 702 to not keep or disseminate any information that it was not 
allowed to collect in the first place.142 The communications must be deleted as early as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Testimony by Robert Litt, General Counsel, Office of Director of National Intelligence, House Judiciary 
Committee Hearing, July 17, 2013, http://www.c-span.org/video/?314032-1/house-judiciary-cmte-holds-
hearing-fisa-authorities. 
139 Lawfare blog, The Minimization and Targeting Procedures: An Analysis, Benjamin Wittes, June 23, 
2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/the-minimization-and-targeting-procedures-an-analysis/.  
140 NSA Slides explain the PRISM data-collection program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/ (“The supervisor 
must endorse the analyst’s “reasonable belief,” defined as a 51 percent confidence that the specified target 
is a foreign national who is overseas at the time of collection.”). 
141 50 U.S.C. §1881a; Lawfare blog, The Minimization and Targeting Procedures: An Analysis, Benjamin 
Wittes, June 23, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/the-minimization-and-targeting-procedures-
an-analysis/.  
142 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (b)(e); 50 U.S.C. §1801 (h). 
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practically possible if it does not contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of 
any crime.143 However, the information of a U.S. person that does not qualify for 
immediate destruction may be kept for up to 5 years.144 The targeting and minimization 
procedures are approved by the FISA Court.145 Possible reforms may change this rule, as 
it has been discussed that new reforms will require phone companies to keep information 
only for as long as they normally would.146 In March 2014, the President announced that 
the government will only receive records with a FISC order approving the use of specific 
phone numbers for queries, will limit the query results to 2 hops instead of the 3 that were 
previously allowed, and a suggested host of other reforms for congress to consider.147 
However, incidental collection of evidence of non-national security crimes, which 
is also outside of the warrant authority to collect only foreign intelligence information, is 
being turned over to law enforcement agencies.148 FISA cannot be used to collect 
evidence on non-national security crimes and for prosecution of those crimes. Some 
FISA information is also being used for ‘parallel construction’ in which a search or arrest 
is based on a tip from the FISA-collected information but law enforcement disguises that 
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145 Director of National Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, June 8, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Facts-on-the-Collection-of-Intelligence-Pursuant-to-Section-702.pdf.  
146 Ellen Nakashima, White House pushes Congress to quickly pass changes to NSA Data Collection 
Program, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-
house-pushes-congress-to-quickly-pass-changes-to-nsa-surveillance-program/2014/03/27/1a2c4052-b5b9-
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148 See Robert Litt, General Counsel Director of National Intelligence, testimony in front of the House 
Judiciary Committee on July 17, 2013 (stating that the metadata information collected can only be used for 
national security investigations and cannot be used in other criminal investigations). 
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fact, and uses the tip as a basis to establish probable cause for a search or arrest.149 These 
actions are illegal, and those crimes require a regular warrant process for collection of 
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Detention 
Domestic Detention Authority 
The U.S. government asserts its detention power to come from the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF).150 This congressional declaration authorized all 
necessary and appropriate force, including detention. Based on the AUMF, the United 
States can detain those involved in the 9/11 attacks and “those who were part of Taliban 
or Al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners, and those who substantially supported Taliban or Al-Qaeda 
forces, or associated forces . . .”151 Additionally, this authority does not extend to only 
those captured in Afghanistan, as “[i]ndividuals who provide support in other parts of the 
world may be properly deemed part of al-Qaida itself.”152 However, with newer groups 
emerging with more distant ties to Al-Qaeda, this statutory authority may be running out, 
leaving the United States without domestic authority for detention.153 It is important to 
note that the President does not claim authority to detain from his Article II power, but 
from a congressional statute, which has limits on when its force continues to be valid 
(assuming until the end of conflict), while the President’s Article II power does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See generally Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to 
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay In Re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation 1 (Mar. 2009). (“[U]nder 
the AUMF, the President has authority to detain persons who he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored 
those responsible for the September 11 attacks. The President also has the authority under the AUMF to 
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151 Faiza Patel, Who Can Be Detained in ‘The War on Terror?’, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.asil.org/files/insight091020pdf.pdf. 
152 Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees 
Held at Guantanamo Bay In Re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation 7 (Mar. 2009). 
153 Chesney et al., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats, HOOVER INSTITUTION 
(2013). 
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expire, and, I believe, would allow for indefinite detention. However, Chesney et al. state 
that the use of only Article II powers for long-term detention is more difficult than with 
statutory authority, and would actually make targeted killings a more attractive option.154 
It should be noted that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in a 2013 Opinion 
declared that the AUMF does not specifically authorize arrest or detention.155 
 The court system has also weighed in on detention authority around the world 
through Gherebi v. Obama, which allows detention of individuals fighting on behalf of 
enemy organizations and not just enemy states.156 Finally, the USA PATRIOT ACT 
permits detention, and not just of terrorists.157  
 
Legality of Detention under IHRL & IHL 
 Under IHRL and IHL, detention is allowed, but only for security purposes.158 The 
United States has claimed that for purposes of capture and detention, both IHRL and IHL 
do not apply concurrently, but only IHL would apply.159 Detention is authorized under 
the ICCPR in Article 9.160 Some argue that the U.S. does not have authority to detain 
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155 G.A. Res. 10/2013, para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/10 (June 12, 2013) (Opinion concerning 
Mr. Obaidullah). 
156 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.Supp. 2d 43 (2011) (holding that the Supreme Court in Hamdi authorized the 
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157 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT)18 USC §1, §412 (2001). 
158 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 42, 78 Aug. 
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160 ICCPR, supra note 103, Art. 9. 
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individuals under Additional Protocols I and II of the Geneva Convention, because they 
state that civilians enjoy protections until they are “directly participating in hostilities.”161 
This means, unless an individual is “directly participating in hostilities”, the U.S. cannot 
detain them, as it has continuously done in this war on terror. However, this argument 
does not extend to the United States, as the U.S. is not limited by these protocols because 
it has not ratified them. Additionally, using this standard to restrict U.S. authority would 
allow for individuals to avoid capture if they violate the laws of war by camouflaging as 
civilians. Amending the Geneva Conventions in this way designates those non-state 
actors who violate the Geneva with combatant status anyway, going against traditional 
use of the Conventions. 
 Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that detention is legal 
in its analysis of Article 9 of the ICCPR. The Committee stated that if preventive 
detention is being used for a public emergency, it must be controlled by specific 
provisions, like it must not be arbitrary, it must be based on grounds and procedures 
established by law, information for the reasons of detention must be given, court control 
of the detention has to be available, and there should be compensation available in case of 
a breach.162 These rules apply in both administrative and criminal detention. 
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When Detention is Arbitrary 
 Article 9 of the UDHR states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention, or exile. Similarly, the ICCPR provides in Article 9 (1) that no person shall be 
subjected to arbitrary detention. Indefinite detention of prisoners is also inconsistent with 
the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.163 
 What is considered ‘arbitrary’ is defined by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention by five categories. Category 1 is when “it is clearly impossible to invoke any 
legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after 
the completion of his sentence…).”164 The U.S. is not violating this, as there is a clear 
legal basis for its detention. Category 2 is “[w]hen the deprivation of liberty results from 
the exercise of rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 10, and 21 of 
[UDHR] and Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 17 of the [ICCPR]”.165 The U.S. has also 
not violated this category. Category 3 is when “the total or partial non-observance of the 
right to a fair trial . . . is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary 
character.”166 This is the basis for the most individual complaints filed with this working 
group. The Working Group has released several opinions regarding detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay stating that the United States has violated this category, and therefore 
those detainees are being held in arbitrary, and therefore illegal, detention. This is 
because the Working Group has stated that the procedure developed by the United States 
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to try Guantanamo detainees does not fulfill their due process rights. Category 4 is when 
individuals “are subjected to prolonged administrative custody without the possibility of 
administrative or judicial review or remedy.”167 The United States is also not a violator of 
this provision. Finally, category 5 is “[w]hen the deprivation of liberty constitutes a 
violation . . . for reasons of discrimination . . . and which aims towards or can result in 
ignoring the equality of human rights.”168 The United States does seem to be violating 
this statute, as all detainees in Guantanamo Bay are only held in that detention facility 
due to their status as a non-U.S. citizen.  
 The United Nations has consistently argued that the detention of prisoners in 
Guantanamo Bay without charge or trial violates international law and is arbitrary.169 The 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary detention, in a 2013 opinion, stated that when  
“the indefinite detention of individuals . . goes beyond a minimally reasonable 
period of time, this constitutes a flagrant violation of international human rights 
law and in itself constitutes a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment.”170 
 
The Working Group held that the detainee in question was in fact being held in arbitrary 
detention in Guantanamo Bay in clear violation of international law, called on the United 
States to expedite the process for transfer of detainees and close the detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Further, In the Human Rights Committee’s report on concluding 
observations of the United States in 2014, the Committee calls on the United States to 
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deal with detainees in the criminal justice system, and to clarify when detainees will be 
afforded the right to legal representation.171 
 Additionally, detention may become arbitrary if it is unduly prolonged, or is not 
subject to periodic review.172 If the detainee is a minor, special “measures of protection 
are required” that a state needs to follow under ICCPR Article 24 for the detention to 
remain legal.173 Further, coverage of an individual by the ICCPR cannot be trumped by 
transferring a detainee outside the borders of the State because the covenant applies to 
anyone that is within the power or effective control of the State party. This means the 
United States cannot avoid compliance by transferring its detainees to Guantanamo Bay 
and attempting to avoid U.S. jurisdiction. 
 
Detention of U.S. Citizens 
 The detention of U.S. citizens is even allowed, as the President can detain any 
individuals that he deems to be dangerous.  U.S. citizens benefit from protection under 
the U.S. Constitution as well, especially the Fourth and Fifth amendments when it comes 
to the question of detention. The Fourth Amendment protects against arbitrary arrest and 
detention, while the Fifth Amendment protects against detainment before conviction.174 
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Preventive detention for the purpose of interrogation would violate both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. 
 There have been several cases that have set the boundaries of U.S. citizen 
detention. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdi was a U.S. citizen held in detention in South 
Carolina. The Supreme Court ruled that his detention was allowed, but that he was 
entitled to counsel and to challenge his detention.175 In the case of Jose Padilla, a U.S. 
citizen, his Fifth Amendment constitutional right was circumvented because he was 
labeled as an enemy combatant, even though he was captured in the United States. He 
was charged with conspiring to kill people in an overseas Jihad, and conspiring to support 
overseas terrorism five years after his initial detention.176 This case shows that U.S. 
citizens may fall under the AUMF if they are deemed enemies in this current war, and 
may be detained regardless of where they were captured. As previously mentioned in this 
paper, U.S. citizens would not be tried in military commissions however, as shown in 
both the Hamdi and Padilla cases. 
 
Detention for Purposes of Interrogation 
 In peacetime, IHRL does not explicitly forbid detention for the purpose of 
intelligence collection, but does state that detention may be for security purposes only, 
and therefore not for the purposes of interrogation. The United States is admittedly 
detaining individuals suspected of terrorism for long periods of time for the purpose of 
intelligence collection through interrogation. Under IHRL, interrogation is not a viable 
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reason for prolonged administrative detention. However, prisoners of war may be held 
until the end of conflict, which is discussed later in this paper. 
 Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, detention may be allowed if “the security 
of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary”.177 Article 78 of the Convention 
allows an Occupying Power to detain persons if it “considers it necessary, for imperative 
reasons of security”.178 The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has also 
written in its procedural principles that detention of an individual must end when that 
individual is no longer a threat to State security.179 This means that there cannot be 
prolonged detention for interrogation unless the detainee is a security threat,180 and once 
the threat ceases, the reason for the detention ceases as well.181 Additionally, according to 
the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, a detention is arbitrary if a detainee is 
held for an indefinite time for the purpose of continued interrogation.182 That type of 
detention is unlawful and also inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. Finally, in 
Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that “indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation 
is not authorized.”183 
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Detention Conditions 
 Detention condition requirements are covered mainly by IHL through the Third 
Geneva Convention. Article 13 requires that “prisoners of war must at all times be 
humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or 
seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited . . .”184 
Harsh interrogation procedures that are against IHRL and IHL are unlawful, and can in 
some cases endanger the health of a prisoner. Those interrogation procedures used 
against an individual in custody are violations of this provision. Additionally, Article 12 
of the Third Geneva Convention states that “[i]rrespective of the individual 
responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given 
them”185, and Article 22 requires giving detainees “every guarantee of hygiene and 
healthfulness.”186 It is vague as to what treatment is encompassed under these Articles, 
and can easily lead to a violation, depending on the judge of the act. In 2010, during 
remarks regarding detainee detention and treatment, Harold Koh guaranteed his devotion 
to ensuring humane treatment for all individuals in U.S. custody that are being held as a 
result of armed conflict.187 
 The indefinite detention that is being carried out by the United States has been 
catalogued to have many psychological effects on detainees.188 These effects may cause 
violations of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment.189 Additionally, arguments about the illegality of 
the conditions of Guantanamo Bay facilities typically include arguments that detainees 
have very limited contact with anyone except for the jail staff, are regularly deprived of 
the ability to eat or exercise communally, lack access to their family, and have almost no 
access to sunlight or fresh air.190 
 
Detention Until the End of Conflict 
 One of the fundamental war powers that the government claims comes from the 
AUMF passed by congress after September 11 is the authority to detain until the end of 
hostilities, assuming that the detention is legal in the first place. The UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention believes that measures adopted in states of emergency, like the 
AUMF, should be in line with the extent of the danger, and an arrest based on this type of 
emergency cannot last indefinitely.191 However, the AUMF authorizes detention that is 
necessary to prevent “future attacks of international terrorism against the United 
States”192 and there have been reported cases of released detainees returning to the 
battlefield.193 The federal government has affirmed on various occasions that it claims 
detention authority to come from the AUMF and not the President’s Article II power, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 UN CAT, supra note 72, at 195. 
190 Guantanamo, Bagram and Illegal U.S. Detentions, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/guantanamo. 
191 UN Committee on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc E/CN 
4/2003/8 (16 December 2002), at 64. 
192 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.1 07-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107pubI40/pdfIPLA W-l 07pubI40.pdf. 
193 Elizabeth Bumiller, Cheney Defends Guantanamo as Essential to War/VP Says that if Freed, Prisoners 
Would Return to Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Cheney-
defends-Guantanamo-as-essential-to-war-2628669.php. 
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which lasts indefinitely. The Supreme Court in Hamdi noted that the authority to detain 
in wartime is grounded in preventing detained individuals from returning to the 
battlefield.194 However, the district court in Qassim v. Bush stated that the government 
lacked the authority to indefinitely detain non-U.S. citizens that were being held at 
Guantanamo Bay several months after they had been determined to no longer be enemy 
combatants.195 The USA PATRIOT Act does permit indefinite detention, with no 
requirement that those being detained indefinitely be removable as terrorists.196  
 Under IHL, the Geneva Convention allows for detention until the end of 
hostilities. The Third Geneva Convention Article 2 (1) provides that in armed conflict, a 
captured person may be detained as a prisoner of war until the end of hostilities.197 
However, the Third Geneva Convention also states in Article 118 that prisoners of war 
cannot be detained indefinitely.198 The Fourth Geneva Convention states the same 
principle in Article 133.199 Therefore, detainees should be released or charged once the 
international conflict is over. The United States cannot hold detainees until the end of the 
conflict if they were not captured on the battlefield or there was no armed conflict going 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-21; See also Nuremburg Military Tribunal, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 229 (1947) 
(“[C]aptivity in war is ‘neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of 
which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war”). 
195 Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005). 
196 PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56, § 412(a)(2), (a)(6) (§ 412 (a)(2) in particular states that the 
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197 GC III, supra note 163, Art. 2(1). 
198 Id. at Art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities”). 
199 GC IV, supra note 158, Art. 133 (“Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of 
hostilities”). 
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on. There are several documented cases of this type of detainee being held at 
Guantanamo Bay.200 In these cases, international humanitarian law does not apply since 
they were not captured on a battlefield, but international human rights law still applies. 
 Indefinite detention is also a violation of IHRL, as Article 9 of the ICCPR 
prohibits arbitrary detention, and Article 14 guarantees prompt trial before a competent 
and impartial tribunal.201 Additionally, IHRL norms require “that the conditions for 
deprivation of liberty under domestic and/or international law be clearly defined.”202 
There are opportunities for derogations from IHRL and IHL in certain circumstances, but 
they cannot be open-ended, and have to be limited in scope and duration.203 Indefinite 
detention is neither limited in scope nor duration. 
 Many that are being held in Guantanamo Bay have been cleared by the U.S. 
Government for transfer or release, but the United States continues to detain them 
because a safe haven has not been found for them, or the United States refuses to return 
them to their country of origin.204 However, the Third Geneva Convention states that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Six men of Algerian origin detained in Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 2001. For the circumstances 
of the arrest and transfer to Guantánamo Bay of the six men, see Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, case No. CH/02/8679 et al., Boudellaa & Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct. 11, 2002, available at www.hrc.ba. 
201 ICCPR, supra note 103, Arts. 9, 14. 
202 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C0I70/TTO (2000) at para. 16 (criticizing a law that allows arrests without warrants because it is 
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203 Zayas, supra note 172, at 16. 
204 There are over 20 Yemeni citizens currently being held in Guantanamo Bay who have been cleared for 
release, but remain in detention because the United States refuses to allow them to return to Yemen. The 
Guantanamo Docket, Citizens of Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, 
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prisoners of war may only be transferred by the United States to a country that is a party 
to the Geneva Convention, only after the United States is satisfied of the ability of the 
receiving country to apply the convention.205 This means the United States does not have 
to transfer prisoners of war if they are not satisfied that the country receiving the 
prisoners have the ability to follow the Convention, or will actually do so while the 
prisoner is in its custody. Additionally, Article 46 states that the prisoner of war should 
not be transferred to any conditions less favourable than the detaining power 
conditions.206 If the United States feels conditions are lower in other countries, it may 
decide to hold the detainees rather than transfer them, for the detainee’s safety and health. 
So far, the United States has transferred over 600 detainees.207  
 The Executive Order 13567 in 2011 mandating Periodic Review states that those 
who have been designated for transfer who have not been transferred will have an annual 
review of “sufficiency and efficacy of transfer efforts” by the review committee.208 This 
Order, while mandating additional protections for status review like the right to have 
counsel, will not make much difference from the current review system if it does not 
provide for the release or actual transfer of those it deems to no longer be a threat. If this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Detentions, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-
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205 GC III, supra note 163, Art. 12. 
206 Id. at Art. 46. 
207 At its peak occupancy, Guantanamo held 779 detainees. Guantanamo By the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, April 9, 2013, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Gitmo-
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208 The White House, Executive Order 13567--Periodic Review of individuals Detained at Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization/or Use o/Military Force, (Mar. 7, 2011), Section 5, 
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is not carried out, then those who pass through the review will end up in the same 
arbitrary category of being cleared for transfer, but still held in Guantanamo.  
 It is difficult to point to when the end of hostilities will be in a ‘war on terror’ and 
many feel that this war on an ideology does not have a defining end point, so detainees 
can be held forever. Many groups consider the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region 
as the end of hostilities. If withdrawal of U.S. troops signals the end of the conflict, does 
this mean detainees will be released? It is unlikely to think that there will be that kind of 
automatic end to this war, and to the detention.  
 
The Right to Challenge Detention 
The question of review of an individual’s detention is an important one in human 
rights law. As the ICRC has noted, “even initially lawful detention becomes arbitrary and 
contrary to law if it is not subject to periodic review.”209 The right to challenge the 
legality of the detention before a court is recognized in the ICCPR Article 9 (4).210 
Further, the Body of Principles set by the UN General Assembly provides that “a 
person shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be 
heard promptly by a judicial or other authority.”211 What can be considered ‘prompt’ 
review was determined by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to be 72 
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210 ICCPR, supra note 103, Art. 9(4). 
211 Human Rights Committee, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 9, UN Doc. AlRES/43/173 (1988) [hereinafter Body of 
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hours212, or up to 14 days for detentions based on terrorism.213  
Who does the habeas right extend to? 
 The writ of habeas corpus under U.S. statute does extend to prisoners if they are 
in U.S. custody.214 However, the same statute to grant this right to prisoners, prohibits 
any court, justice, or judge from having the “jurisdiction to hear or consider an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
[U.S.] who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as 
an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”215 Since 2006, however, the 
Supreme Court has stated that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay do fall under the 
Geneva Convention, and therefore are not considered enemy combatants.216 The reason 
that combatants were first held outside the United States in Guantanamo Bay was 
because it was thought at that time that those detained outside of the United States had 
fewer rights.217 
 Under IHRL, the ICCPR Article 9 (4) has been widely interpreted to guarantee 
the right to habeas corpus to every detainee.218 Most have agreed that this broad language 
is too encompassing and this interpretation of article 9 is too broadly drawn to stretch the 
purpose of that Article beyond its intention to provide only the right to an effective court 
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proceeding to provide meaningful review of the lawfulness of one’s detention.219 Prior to 
the shift in U.S. law in 2008, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded 
in various opinions that the denial of habeas corpus rights to Guantanamo detainees by 
the United States constituted a violation of ICCPR Article 9.220 
The right of a detainee to habeas corpus has changed many times during the 
current war on terror. After the war began, the first signs of a right to habeas came in 
Rasul v. Bush in 2004.221 The Supreme Court ruled that federal courts did have 
jurisdiction over detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, which allowed the detainees to file 
petitions seeking habeas corpus to challenge their detention.222 In 2006, however, in a 
response to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld223, Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act (MCA), which took away the right of any federal court to hear 
habeas petitions that were brought by, or on behalf of, any Guantanamo detainee.224 
Finally, in 2008 the Supreme Court released their opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, which 
held that detainees that were held at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to habeas corpus.225 
This precedent has not yet been overruled. The right of the writ of habeas corpus was 
solidified again by the President in 2011 in an Executive Order for periodic review of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 The language of ICCPR Art. 9(4) only states that detainees are entitled to “take proceedings before a 
court”. ICCPR, supra note 103, Art. 9(4). 
220 See Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Opinion No. 2/2009 para. 33; Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention Opinion No. 3/2009 (United States of America), A/HRC/13/30/Add.1, para. 36; Situation of 
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221 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the D.C. District Court has jurisdiction 
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222 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.  
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detainees.226 
What did Boumediene change in practice? 
 Although the Supreme Court precedent in Boumediene v. Bush is still good law 
today, many have argued that in practice, the habeas right of detainees is still not upheld. 
The Supreme Court’s defense of the habeas right in Boumediene has been called a fool’s 
errand because of its subsequent denials of certiorari in Guantanamo habeas cases, which 
uphold the D.C. Circuit decisions to deny those petitions, and make it very difficult for a 
detainee to ever win a habeas case in the trial courts.227 The interest in the Boumediene 
decision seems to be to preserve jurisdiction, and not to actually expand the rights of 
Guantanamo detainees. Over half of the men that are still held at Guantanamo have been 
cleared for release, but have been denied a Supreme Court hearing.228 Denying these 
cases means the court has not put into practice the ruling in Boumediene that guarantees 
detainees a constitutional right to have their detention reviewed. 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
 
 Combatant Status Review Tribunals, or CSRTs, were created in 2004 by the 
Department of Defense229, soon after the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush 
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decisions,230 which reaffirmed the right of Guantanamo detainees to have their detention 
status reviewed. These tribunals are set up to review a detainee’s status as an enemy 
combatant.231 The CSRTs do not satisfy the rulings in Hamdi and Rasul, and therefore do 
not comply with national law, and fall short of compliance with IHRL and IHL.  
In a 2009 opinion, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stressed that 
the CSRTs do not meet the minimum standards set by the ICCPR, of which the United 
States is a party, nor the UDHR.232 The ICCPR Article 14 (1) states that “[i]n the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit 
at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.”233 The UDHR also states this as a basic human 
right in its Article 10.234 The right to a fair trial is also provided for in all four Geneva 
Conventions.235 Denying a protected person from a fair and regular trial is a breach of the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and is listed as a war crime in the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Court, of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.236 Additionally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 508 (holding that a detainee should be given meaningful opportunity to contest the 
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231 CSRT Order, supra note 229. 
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the CSRT hearings must allow for a detained person to have access to counsel pursuant to 
the Body of Principles.237 
The administrative CSRT hearings do not satisfy the due process and fair trial 
requirements set out in IHRL and IHL. These hearings are “closed to the public; 
detainees are prohibited from rebutting evidence; they are denied legal counsel238; they 
are required to disprove their guilt; and are compelled to self-incriminate.”239 Detainees 
are also prohibited from introducing exculpatory information, and the hearings can 
consider unreliable hearsay evidence240 and evidence allegedly procured through torture 
and other forms of coercion.241 The detainee additionally does have the right to see any 
classified evidence presented against him242, and a majority of the panel decisions are 
based on classified evidence.243 The CSRTs also require that the court presume in favor 
of the Government’s evidence of “enemy combatant status”, that the evidence is “genuine 
and accurate”.244 Additionally, IHL in the Third Geneva Conventions requires that trials 
be held by an independent and impartial tribunal.245 CSRTs are not independent and 
impartial as the panel is comprised of three military officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, 
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and therefore there exists a bias against the detainees.246 CSRTs therefore violate human 
rights of due process and a fair and public hearing in front of an independent and 
impartial tribunal. 
Annual Review Boards 
The tribunals convened once a year to determine the need for continued detention 
after a CSRT decision has been made are called Annual Review Boards (ARBs). The 
Review Boards were created to annually review whether a detainee is still a threat to the 
United States.247 If an individual is found to no longer be a threat, he could be returned to 
his home country and either face further detention or be released there.248 In making a 
decision, the Review Boards look at whether or not the detainee pose any danger to the 
United States, whether the detainee continues to have intelligence value, and whether 
there is any other reason to detain.249  
 These tribunals need to comply with the same international human rights and 
humanitarian principles that the CSRTs are required to follow. Namely, the appropriate 
provisions in the ICCPR, the UDHR, and the Geneva Conventions.250 The Annual 
Review Boards fail to meet human rights law standards for many of the same reasons that 
CSRTs do not comply. ARBs do not allow for the ability to review or confront 
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government evidence, do not allow for the assistance of counsel, and consider unreliable 
evidence and coerced statements.251 
Periodic Review After 2011  
In March of 2011, President Obama issued executive order number 13567, 
entitled “Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station 
Pursuant to the Authorization of Use of Military Force”.252 The objective of the 
Executive Order is to “ensure that military detention of individuals now held . . . 
continues to be carefully evaluated.”253 The inter-agency task force will review prior 
detention determinations to identify whether additional detainees can be set for 
transfer.254 Among other things, each detainee receives an initial review255, must be 
represented by counsel256, are permitted to present oral and written testimony, can 
introduce relevant information and written declarations, can answer any questions from 
the Periodic Review Board, and can call witnesses.257 Additionally, the Order requires 
that a prompt decision be made by consensus and provided in writing within 30 days.258 
The process calls for an in-person review once every 3 years, and a file-based review 
every 6 months.259 Further, if a determination is made that a detainee should no longer be 
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detained, “vigorous efforts” must be made to find a suitable transfer location.260 Although 
is it undefined what entails vigorous effort, it is clear the United States is moving toward 
including more protections for detainees that better mirror protections in human rights 
law and humanitarian law.  
Although the Executive Order states that “[f]or each detainee, an initial review 
shall commence as soon as possible but no later than 1 year from the date of this 
order”261, the United States government did not begin the Periodic Review Board (PRB) 
process until October 2013. In late 2013, the Department of Defense announced that the 
review for detainee Mahmud Al Aziz Al Mujahid was complete. The PRB determined for 
this detainee that law of war detention was no longer necessary to protect against a 
continuing significant threat, and he is eligible for transfer. However, the conditions for 
his transfer are the same as those for the detainees currently in the “conditional detention” 
category, “specifically, that the security situation improves in Yemen, that an appropriate 
rehabilitation program becomes available, or that an appropriate third country 
resettlement option becomes available.”262 While a few detainees have been released in 
late 2013 through early 2014, the process remains slow. Only 71 detainees have been 
determined eligible for Periodic Review Board hearings out of the over 150 still detained 
at Guantanamo Bay.263 A website by the Periodic Review Secretariat containing 
information on when detainees will have their PRB hearing, and documents regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Periodic Review EO, supra note 208, at 4(a). 
261 Id. at Sec. 3(a). 
262 News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Completion of First Guantanamo Periodic Review Board 
(Jan. 09, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16473.  
263 Jason Leopold, Identities of 71 Gitmo Prisoners Eligible for Hearings Released by U.S., ALJAZEERA 
AM., Feb. 20, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/19/71-guantanamo-
prisonerseligibleforparolehearings.html. 
	   59	  
past detainee hearings is now available for the public.264 The review information tab will 
post unclassified documents summarizing the sessions, and an unclassified summary will 
be provided for final determinations. 
This is an important step toward the closure of Guantanamo Bay. However, the 
only way to really know whether this new policy will comply with the rules of IHRL and 
IHL is to monitor the implementation of this Executive Order. If the Order does not 
create a system for actual transfer of cleared detainees, then it will serve much of the 
same purpose than the current system of “conditional detention”. Those who are cleared 
through periodic review would just be entered into the same category of detainees who 
are currently cleared for transfer, but are still held in Guantanamo Bay. Further, moving 
detainees to a different location for continued indefinite detention also does not solve the 
issues of improper detention, continued harsh interrogation, and a lack of judicial review. 
Not until this process leads to a fair trial or actual removal of the detainee from the 
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Interrogation and Torture 
Domestic Interrogation Authority 
 The United States government asserts its authority to collect intelligence to come 
from the AUMF, which authorized all necessary and appropriate force, including 
intelligence collection. The executive, as commander in chief, has a war power authority 
to decide whether detainees can be interrogated. Case law has further determined that 
aliens held outside the United States could be interrogated. The district court in O.K. v. 
Bush rejected a motion by a detainee to enjoin the use of interrogations on him.265 The 
court held that the detainee did not provide any law stating that courts have the power to 
intrude on the Executive’s war power to forbid the interrogation of individuals that are 
held in the course of ongoing military conflict.266  
 United States statutes prohibit certain treatment, however. The Torture Act in the 
United States makes torture criminal if it is committed or attempted outside the United 
States if the offender is a U.S. citizen or the offender is in the United States.267 However, 
it only outlaws “severe” physical or mental pain, and defines “severe” as “prolonged 
harm”.268 These definitions are vague, leave loopholes for dangerous interrogation, and 
created more uncertainty about the legal limits of torture. The legal memos on torture 
written by the Office of Legal Counsel under Yoo also lacked a workable definition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 O.K. v Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting a motion of an alien detainee to enjoin the 
use of interrogation against him.). 
266 Id. 
267 Torture Act 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (a). 
268 Torture Act 18 U.S.C. § 2340. 
	   61	  
“severe pain” for use in a terrorism context.269 Further, the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 prohibits cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment and punishment of any person if 
they are in custody or otherwise under the physical control of the United States.270 
 
Limits on Interrogation Methods in IHRL and IHL 
Certain interrogation procedures are outlawed by IHRL and IHL, even during 
war. Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment, as well as outrages against human dignity of prisoners of war is prohibited.271 
This covers a wide spectrum from mere coercion to torture. The Third Geneva 
Convention states that “prisoners must at all times be humanely treated,” and prohibits 
“acts of violence or intimidation.”272 It is questionable what can be considered unlawful 
coercion, or what is outside the scope of ‘humane’ treatment. The question of who the 
Geneva Convention applies to for purposes of interrogation was settled in Hamdan. The 
Court ruled that even if a person would not fall under the Third Geneva Convention, 
consensus is growing that they would fall under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and said 
there is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and if an individual is 
not entitled to protection of the Third Convention he or she falls within the Fourth 
Convention.273  
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According to Article 17 in the Third Geneva Convention, “every prisoner of war . 
. . is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, 
regimental, personal or serial number, or . . . equivalent information.”274 It seems, 
however, that asking more than for this basic information would not be prohibited under 
the Geneva Convention, unless further information is sought through any “physical or 
mental torture, or any other form of coercion”.275 Further, any “[p]risoners of war who 
refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”276 This final requirement seems to encompass 
far too many activities that can easily be construed as “unpleasant”, and it is very broad 
and makes it difficult to assess whether U.S. policy follows this provision. Opinions will 
always differ regionally, culturally, and personally whether a prisoner was exposed to 
“unpleasant” or “disadvantageous” treatment.  
 Under IHRL, torture is outlawed clearly by Article 7 of the ICCPR.277 While 
some provisions of the ICCPR can be derogated from, this provision can never be 
derogated from for any reason. The UN Convention Against Torture further outlaws 
certain procedure. Article 1 of the UN CAT prohibits any act by which severe prolonged 
mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted (which has been narrowed by further 
congressional reservations).278 Article 16 states that a state shall prevent cruel, inhumane, 
or degrading treatment in any territory under its jurisdiction.279 The test under this 
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convention as to what is considered cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment is whether 
the action is shocking to the conscience. It is a very subjective test. In 2014, the Human 
Rights Committee in its periodic observations report asked the United States to instigate 
investigations into cases of torture or CID treatment, and to clarify whether enhanced 
interrogation techniques that are now outlawed are in violation of article 7 of the 
ICCPR.280 
Additionally, torture or other acts that can cause physical or mental harm are also 
prohibited by international criminal law, and in certain circumstances can even amount to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.281 These terms outlawing certain conduct are 
ambiguous, confusing, and even many lawyers and military officers are unclear as to 
what they encompass. Many supposed violations occurred just after the beginning of the 
war when the government agencies responsible for determining the scope and limitations 
of interrogation procedures did not produce internal regulations for their officers who 
were already actively engaged in capture and interrogation. The long time it took to 
establish those procedures produced much confusion as to what United States agents can 
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Known Interrogation Methods before 2009 
 Before standards for interrogation procedures were updated in 2009, certain 
interrogation procedures were used, many of which have been criticized for being too 
harsh on detainees. These methods include sleep deprivation, slamming a person into a 
wall, forced grooming and removal of clothing, interrogation for up to 20 hours, using a 
detainee’s individual phobias to induce stress, hitting a detainee with guns and other 
objects, forcing a detainee to listen to continuous loud music, and waterboarding.282 
Additional documented methods include shackling into painful stress positions for long 
periods while naked,283 threats of deportation and rape,284 solitary confinement,285 and 
locking a detainee in a small box.286 These methods, even when combined, were found by 
the Bush administration CIA legal counsel not to violate anti-torture statutes.287 Under 
the UCMJ, however, they do violate the Geneva Convention’s ban against cruel 
inhumane and degrading treatment. Depending on the individual, and cultural 
sensitivities, these methods can cause definite suffering. 
 The practice of rendition has also been reported, and is inconsistent with IHRL 
and IHL. Rendition consists of sending a detainee to a country where they are at serious 
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risk of torture.288 This “practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’ constitutes a violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 7 of the ICCPR.”289 However, 
the United States has stated that it “does not transfer persons to countries where it 
believes it is ‘more likely than not’ that they will be tortured.”290 
 
Interrogation Methods After 2009 
 The President issued an Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 
in 2009 in order to “promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in 
United States custody and of United States personnel who are in armed conflicts, to 
ensure compliance with treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva 
Conventions, . . .”291 This Executive Order overturned Executive Order 13440, an Order 
by President Bush that limited the War Crimes Act292 and requires compliance with the 
Army Field Manual and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.293 This order 
banned the use of torture and the President directed that executive officials could no 
longer rely on Justice Department OLC memos that permitted practices that he considers 
to be torture.  This Executive Order further closes a previous loophole, and covers the 
CIA as well as the military. The President further mandated that CIA “black sites” be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Situation of Detainees, supra note 50, at para. 55. 
289 Id. 
290 Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Committee 
Against Torture, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, para. 7 (25 July 2006). 
291 Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Jan. 22 2009, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations. 
292 Executive Order 13440, Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3, July 20, 2007. 
293 Harold Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Dept of State, remarks at annual meeting of the American 
Society of International Law (March 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter Koh Remarks]. 
	   66	  
closed down and ordered the Secretary of Defense to conduct reviews and visits to 
Guantanamo Bay to ensure the conditions at the prison were in accordance with Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.294 
The Obama administration has a more expansive conception of what is not 
allowed, and construed torture more broadly than the Bush administration, which 
construed torture narrowly to protect harsh interrogation procedures from falling outside 
of the protections of IHRL and IHL. Now that these protections have been articulated, the 
CIA seems unwilling to allow harsh interrogation procedures again, even if a future 
administration should return to a Bush era policy, for fear of leaving the CIA 
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Targeted Killing 
Domestic authority  
According to a Department of Justice White paper released in early 2013, the 
President has the authority to use lethal targeting “arising from his constitutional 
responsibility to protect the country, the inherent right to life of the United States to 
national self defense under international law, Congress’s authorization of the use of all 
necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an 
armed conflict with al-Qa’ida under international law”295 The domestic legal authority 
comes mainly from the 2001 AUMF, which allows killings as part of “all necessary and 
appropriate force” to go after persons that took part in the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.296 There has been recent talk in Congress to push the Executive branch to refine 
who are considered “associated forces” for targeting purposes, as currently, the AUMF 
allows targeting for individuals with cursory ties to Al Qaeda, as much as it allows for 
targeting of Al Qaeda members.297 As with detention authority, if Congress decides to 
pass a new AUMF, it should limit the President’s power in accordance with international 
law. Chesney et al. argue for distinguishing congressional authority for detention and 
targeting when creating new statutory authority.298  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen 
Who Is a Senior Operation Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force, 1, available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [hereinafter DOJ 
White Paper]. 
296 Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, May 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
297 Carlos Munoz, Defense Lawmakers Consider Changing Rules of Terror War, THE HILL DEFENSE BLOG, 
May 31, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/302655-defense-lawmakers-may-
change-rules-of-terror-war#ixzz2V7ZyfYsK. 
298 Chesney at al., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats, HOOVER INSTITUTION, 13 
(2013). 
	   68	  
Right to Life 
International law prohibits arbitrary killings in Article 6 of the ICCPR.299 Lethal 
force can only be used if it is a last resort against a concrete, specific, and imminent 
threat of ‘grave’ harm300 In order for a targeted killing operation to be legal, there must 
be a domestic foundation for the state to use lethal force, there must be a proper purpose, 
there must be an imminent threat, and the killing must have necessity. A proper purpose 
is when the state uses lethal force when trying to protect the lives of others, and necessity 
requires the analysis of whether there is a lesser violent means to achieve the same ends. 
While the ICCPR allows for derogations from Articles 9, 14, and 24 for example, there is 
no derogation allowed from Article 6. In war, however, if an individual is directly 
participating in hostilities, it is legal under IHRL and IHL to use lethal force.  
To understand the requirements in the ICCPR Article 6, McCann v. UK and the 
Israel High Court of Justice further defined some of these terms. In McCann v. UK, three 
individuals were killed on suspicion of being about to detonate a bomb. The court in this 
case ruled that the imminence and necessity threats were not satisfied, lethal force was 
not necessary, and the killing constituted a breach of Article 6 (or Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights).301 The European Court of Human Rights 
developed from this case a stricter necessity requirement that requires an operation to 
first be planned without the need kill suspects, and appropriate safeguards should be put 
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into place to prevent any killing.302 The Israel High Court of Justice further held that it is 
permissible to attack civilians if they are directly participating in hostilities.303 The test of 
when a killing is appropriate includes assessment of the timing of the act, whether it is 
indirect or direct, and not attacking if a less harmful means is feasible.304 The Israeli court 
also requires that a proportionality analysis be made where collateral damage is 
possible.305 
 The right to life is also protected in Article 1 of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.306 These Articles prohibit the 
arbitrary deprivation of life. 
 
When Targeted Killing is Appropriate 
 Targeted killings are appropriate during war, as an act of self-defense of the 
nation,307 as long as the target has a ‘continuous combat function’ and is therefore a 
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306 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Art.1 (1948) (“Every human being has the right to life…”), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Organization of American States, Art. 4, (July 1978) (“Every person has the right to have 
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32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf; UDHR, supra note 51, Art. 3 (“Everyone has the right 
to life. . .”). 
307 DOJ White Paper, supra note 295. 
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combatant.308 This means there is no legal authority to kill any civilian unless they are 
directly participating in hostilities. The individual cannot be targeted if they are out of 
combat, can be captured instead, if they manifest a clear intention to stop combat, if they 
are wounded, sick, or rendered defenseless, or are shipwrecked.309 The ‘direct’ temporal 
element here is difficult to define, and can be interpreted many ways, depending on the 
motivations of the party doing the interpretation. In 2010, legal advisor to the State 
Department, Harold Koh, stated that “whether a particular individual will be targeted in a 
particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those 
related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and 
the willingness and ability for those states to suppress the threat the target poses.”310 He 
also mentioned that the United States targeting operations would be consistent with law 
of war principles, including distinction and proportionality.311 
However, it has been argued by U.S. officials that the imminence standard when it 
comes to terrorism is different than with other targeted killing operations, and the killings 
are deemed necessary by U.S. officials to prevent terrorist attacks on American citizens. 
In a 2011 memo, and re-iterated in a 2013 Department of Justice White Paper, John 
Brennan makes it clear that for a threat to be “imminent”, it “does not require the United 
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take 
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place in the immediate future.”312 This is because the threat is constant and secret, and 
waiting to act until just before an attack is going to occur “would not allow the United 
States sufficient time to defend itself”.313 It seems that in the war on terror, the 
requirements for targeted killing operations to be carried out are satisfied for limited 
circumstances.  
 Targeted killings are also legal against citizens, as long as Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights are not violated. However, despite a citizen’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment due process rights, citizens do not have immunity from targeted killings, and 
it is not considered a war crime or an assassination under Executive Order 12333. In a 
white paper release by the Department of Justice, the government concluded that use of 
lethal force against a U.S. citizen in a foreign country was legal when three conditions are 
met: the individual is determined to be an imminent threat, capture is infeasible, and the 
operation is conducted according to law of war principles.314 Further, in a speech by 
President Obama on U.S. counterterrorism policy in May 2013, he stated that “[w]hen a 
citizen goes abroad to wage war against America-and is actively plotting to kill U.S. 
citizens; and [capture is not feasible] his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than 
a sniper shooting down an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team.”315 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 DOJ White Paper, supra note 295. 
313 Id. 
314 Id.  
315 President Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-
university [hereinafter Defense University Remarks]. 
	   72	  
 Targeted killings are not appropriate for assassinations, as set in Executive Order 
12333.316 It is legal, however, to carry out targeted killing operations in foreign countries 
under international laws of sovereignty and neutrality if the country in which the strikes 
are taking place consented to the strikes within their borders, or the host nation was 
unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual target.317 In some cases, 
the U.S. Government is within its rights to use lethal force on foreign soil without 
consent if the use of self-defense is necessary.318 Peacetime assassinations should not be 
confused with targeted killings, as they have been banned since 1976.319 
 
Legality of targeted killing by drone program under IHRL/IHL 
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man govern the use of lethal force by 
states and prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of life.320 However, if the state is threatened 
by violence, the state has a right, and even an obligation, to protect its citizens by the use 
of lethal force.321 
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Targeted Killings, Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
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The drone program operates mostly under the executive branch with much 
secrecy on who is targeted, and how and when targeted killings take place. The CIA has 
traditionally managed most of the drone strike operations outside of recognized war 
zones, while the defense department has managed operations in theatres of war.322 In 
2013, the President moved more operations to the control of the defense department, 
some say to increase transparency and streamline the process.323 Drone strikes were 
primarily occurring in Afghanistan and Pakistan but in recent years has expanded to 
include other countries like Yemen and Somalia.324 The UN Human Rights Committee, 
in its 2014 concluding observations report of the United States, has asked the United 
States to clarify how targeted killings are conducted through drone attacks, to clarify 
whether the civilian casualties involved are in compliance with Covenant obligations, and 
whether the drone program fully complies with the obligation to protect life under Article 
6.325 
 While IHRL and IHL do limit the types of weapons that can be used,326 and in 
what situations, military technology and weaponry is so technical that it is something 
that’s difficult to analyze under current conventions. In the Nuclear Weapons Case in the 
International Court of Justice, the Court affirmed that the prohibition of means and 
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Masters, supra note 319. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. 
325 Human Rights Committee, List of Issues in Relation to the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States 
of America, 2, CCPR/C/USA/4 and Corr. 1 (Mar. 2013). 
326 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules, (2005). 
	   74	  
suffering as one of the “cardinal principles” of international humanitarian law.327 These 
methods are defined by the ICJ as “a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve 
legitimate military objectives”.328 The 2002 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights mentions restricted weapons that 
cause undue suffering as “poisonous gas” or “bacteriological weapons”.329 Some states 
have also included in military manuals that weapons that render death inevitable are 
prohibited.330 Of course, those states just serve as guides, and are not binding on United 
States law or policy. However, under these regulations, drones may cause undue harm as 
death is inevitable of not only the target, but of nearby civilians, which goes against the 
principle of distinction that belligerents cannot target civilians. Further, the United States 
does not follow international standards set by the ICRC on the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities. Some drone strikes are carried out amongst individuals in their 
normal course of business in a day, rather than while they are directly participating in 
hostilities. The U.S. re-definition of the requirement by stating that all terrorists are 
always ‘directly participating’ goes against the ICRC guidelines and international 
convention and acceptance.   
In 2010, the state department legal advisor remarked that the use of “unmanned 
aerial vehicles” for targeting operations are not prohibited, as “long as they are employed 
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in conformity with applicable laws of war.”331 He further stated that drones do not cause 
undue harm, meet the principles of distinction and military necessity, and lethal force 
against specific individuals is OK if it is in the course of armed conflict or in self-
defense.332 The controversial use of drones was further defended by the President in a 
speech in May 2013 on United States counterterrorism policy.  The President stated that 
individuals, including U.S. citizens, who are plotting terrorist attacks against Americans 
are proper targets for drone strikes, but the administration will seek to create stricter 
reviews for the use of drones in targeted killing operations.333 The nomination of John 
Brennan to take over the CIA by the President shows that targeted killings by drone 
strikes will continue to be a prominent tactic, as Brennan played a large role in the 
expansion of targeted killings during the Obama administration.  
 
Collateral Damage 
Under international law, a killing is not allowed if there is a possibility that the 
strike will knowingly and unwillingly kill civilians while fulfilling a proper military 
objective. Civilians cannot be killed unless they are directly participating in hostilities.334 
The state has a responsibility to distinguish between civilians and those individuals that 
pose the threat necessitating lethal force.335 Any use of force that is indiscriminate and 
reckless that causes collateral damage constitutes violations of Article 4 of the American 
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Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man.336  
Collateral damage has always been a consequence of war, and many would argue 
that the use of drones actually decreases the amount of civilian casualties, injuries, and 
other collateral damage, such as damage to civilian property.337 Some claim that the 
civilian death toll from targeting operations is exaggerated for foreign and domestic 
political purposes. President Obama in May 2013 noted in a speech that “there is a wide 
gap between U.S. assessment of such casualties, and non-governmental reports.”338 In 
further defending the drone program, the President stated that “the terrorists we are after 
target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any 
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Conclusions 
Effects of IHRL and IHL on U.S. national security policy-making 
 
As Jack Goldsmith writes in his earlier book about his time as head of the Office 
of Legal Counsel, the Bush administration was making policy on the edges of legality.340 
The Geneva Conventions played a large role in deciding what the President could legally 
do when it came to the U.S. military and intelligence agencies. The administration was so 
concerned with preventing another 9/11 from happening that it was willing to create 
policy that allowed the President to do everything he could legally possibly do. While 
this allowed for an expansion of power in national security matters, it created policy 
based on constantly pushing legal limits and forgetting the aspects of smart policy 
making, which led to many blunders in the Bush administration, among them the policy 
concerning treatment and interrogation of detainees. 
I also believe that the use of universal jurisdiction limited, and currently limits the 
executive office worried about the use of lawfare.341 The hyper-legalization of warfare 
makes acting outside of legal limits or even at the edge of legal limits very dangerous. In 
order to protect top U.S. government officials and military members from later 
prosecution for their actions, lawyers should determine legal limitations according to 
international standards, and further align with definitions of the laws of war as 
determined by international consensus. Some human rights law provisions are general 
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and create varied interpretations, so acknowledging the scope of the laws that are set by 
international consensus would better protect officials. Working at the far reaches of what 
may be considered legal and necessary at that moment can be seen differently in 
retrospect. There should be a better balance between creating policy in an emergency, 
and creating policy that fully supports the laws of war that also fulfill the U.S. 
government’s duty to keep citizens safe. This would better insulate government officials 
from fighting lengthy and expensive legal battles for actions they took in good faith to 
fulfill their duty and protect their country. 
The Executive does not go unchecked, however. The President remains 
accountable to various checks, including Congress and the courts on national security 
issues. The public is kept in the dark about much national security intelligence and policy 
making, and must trust the executive and other bodies to develop policy that comports 
with American values. Because of the amount of secrecy involved in this area, Congress, 
the courts, and especially the government’s lawyers have a major responsibility to ensure 
that the executive power is checked, and actions of the United States government remain 
legal and humane. Several congressional committees review intelligence and confidential 
information to ensure that they are creating informed policy that doesn’t harm the 
American people. These committees call executive officers to testify in public hearings in 
front of Congress to hold them accountable for their actions when necessary. Further, 
even the Supreme Court has weighed in on difficult national security questions that has 
transformed U.S. national security policy. It is the lawyers in various agencies and in the 
Justice Department that set the legal limits that guide U.S. policy. It is well known that 
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appointees to the Office of Legal Counsel responsible for setting legal guidelines to what 
the President can and cannot do, are appointed many times for political reasons.342 Many 
lawyers have publicly written about their struggles with pushing back against an 
executive office intent on building Presidential power and expanding their capabilities in 
national security. 
 
Have there been moves toward compliance in the new administration? 
 It seems under the Obama administration, U.S. counterterrorism policy has further 
complied with IHRL and IHL than in the Bush administration, but only slightly. There 
have been a few moves away from compliance, and some unfulfilled policy objectives 
that could increase compliance further. One of the largest changes between 
administrations is that the Obama administration has a more expansive conception of 
what is not allowed when it comes to harsh interrogation tactics. The current 
administration construes torture more broadly than the Bush administration, which 
construed torture narrowly to protect harsh interrogation procedures from falling outside 
of the protections of IHRL and IHL. This is most evident in President Obama signing 
Executive Order 13491, which overturned Bush’s Executive Order 13440 that limited the 
War Crimes Act. 
 Further, under the Bush administration, detention authority was claimed from the 
President’s Article II power, which could allow for indefinite detention. The current 
administration asserts its power to come from the AUMF, thereby limiting its authority to 
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detain past the scope of the statute.343 However, should a new AUMF be created to deal 
with emerging threats no longer directly affiliated with Al-Qaeda, it should further limit 
and constrain presidential power instead of creating wide latitude for endless war.344 
Limiting U.S. action by congressional statute increases the legitimacy of U.S. operations 
under international law and would increase ally support.345 Additionally, the Obama 
administration has expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of 
U.S. detention authority.346  
 Much policy has remained the same, such as the similar narrow definition of 
habeas corpus rights for detainees. There have been some steps back as well under the 
current administration. Although the President has stated that he will close Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility to further comply with international law, the prison remains open, 
and detainees are being held at the prison without charge or trial, nor the opportunity to 
transfer, despite many of them having already been cleared for transfer. A majority of the 
transfers of cleared detainees that have been made were done by the Bush 
administration.347 President Obama even acknowledged the continuation of Bush era 
policy of indefinite military detention, acknowledging that some detainees continue to 
pose a threat to the United States.348 One small difference is the Bush administration 
claimed detention power for those who supported terrorism, while the Obama 
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administration claims detention power for those who “substantially support” terrorist 
groups. The Obama administration further continued the Bush-era surveillance policies 
and even enhanced the capabilities of the NSA, expanding the information being 
collected under secret programs. Protections of the right to unwarranted search of citizens 
as well as human rights of privacy and freedom of expression and association have 
decreased as government capabilities have increased with new technology. 
Additionally, although targeted killings are legal under international law as long 
as certain principles are followed, an expansive interpretation of those principles, which 
are meant to limit the amount of targeted killings, may amount to a violation of 
international law. For example, international law requires that all targeted killings be 
necessary, and without alternative means for capture, which would limit the amount of 
individuals that the U.S. government could target. If the current administration is 
following similar minimization procedures, it is suspect therefore, that the number of 
drone strikes has increased enormously under the Obama administration. In just his first 2 
years in office, President Obama authorized almost 4 times as many drone strikes in 
Pakistan as President Bush did in his entire 8 years in office.349  
 
Are the moves toward compliance on paper or in practice? 
 The moves toward compliance in the right to habeas or proper review have been 
mostly formally asserted on paper, but not in practice. After the Boumediene ruling in 
2008, detainees held in Guantanamo Bay were given the right to challenge their detention 
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in the U.S. court system. Since 2008, there have been many denials of certiorari in 
Guantanamo habeas cases. Additionally, the CSRT panels have not proven to be adequate 
procedures under international law. In 2011, President Obama signed an Executive Order 
mandating that all detainees be given Periodic Review. This procedure would make great 
strides in moving the U.S. policy for review closer to IHRL and IHL standards, as, 
among other things, these procedures provide for initial review, counsel representation, 
and trial procedure more similar to the U.S. civilian system. It is not known whether there 
will be a system for actual transfer of detainees. If the Periodic Review Board only clears 
a detainee for transfer, then puts them into the same category of “conditional detention” 
as current detainees who have been cleared for transfer but not released from 
Guantanamo Bay, then the Periodic Reviews will be far less meaningful than they appear 
to be. 
 Further, the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay is another source of 
international law violations, and the President’s stated mandate to close the facility 
remain only on paper, and not in practice. The commitment to close the facility was first 
made in 2009,350 and since then, no moves have been made to carry out the order. The 
detention facility bars detainees from effective review, allows a culture of enhanced 
interrogation that has amounted to torture in many cases, and bars detainees from 
receiving proper medical care.351 Beyond the plight of the individual detainees, the 
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detention facility works as a recruiting tool for terrorists all over the world, and costs the 
United States millions of dollars per year that can be spent otherwise.  
 
Amending IHRL and IHL to deal with the current war on terror 
Some elements of today’s war were probably never imagined at the time the 
Geneva Conventions were drafted. The drafters at the time couldn’t have known that an 
entirely new enemy of non-state actors that hid among civilians and did not wear a 
uniform would be the main enemy in a major war. The United States’ decision to treat the 
conflict with this enemy as a war and not as crimes has led to a redefinition of the 
Conventions in a way that creates gaps, and reduces protections that were meant to 
encompass all people in war. When the U.S. claimed it has complied by the laws of war, 
it is only because the U.S. redefined laws to apply to a new conflict that the laws were 
never intended to cover. So technically, the U.S. complied, because their definitions and 
applications ensured that it would. 
Some of the ambiguities inherent in the Geneva Conventions are the prohibitions 
against certain interrogation procedure. The Conventions prohibit “outrages against 
human dignity”352 which covers everything from coercion to torture, “acts of violence 
and intimidation”,353 and mandates that prisoners must be “humanely treated”.354Article 
17 also prohibits physical or mental torture or coercion and any “unpleasant or 
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disadvantageous” treatment.355 All of these tests are subjective and open to wide 
interpretation. Narrowing the definitions of what is prohibited will not be more 
protective, but supplanting these Articles with more concrete boundaries of what is 
considered coercion, or what is outside the scope of ‘humane’ can be helpful, without 
narrowing the terms. Narrowing the terms may leave even bigger gaps. More comments 
on these definitions, however, would be helpful. A test to decide whether something is 
‘shocking to the conscience’ will be interpreted as narrowly as possible by a country like 
the United Sates, worried about doing everything it can to protect its citizens.  
Some general things about the Conventions would also be helpful to amend to 
deal with today’s type of war. The laws should account for the fact that many of today’s 
wars are not between states but between a state and a non-state actor, so a new law should 
apply to all armed conflicts, instead of narrowly applying during international conflicts 
between state actors. For example, it is hard to argue today under the laws of war that an 
attack on U.S. soil by organized non-state actors constitutes an act of war, while in 
today’s world, this is now a norm. The definitions of what is a combatant should also be 
amended. It is not realistic today to expect that terrorists will wear “distinctive signs 
recognizable at a distance” or “carry arms openly”.356 Further, including a framework for 
deciding when military force is justified, and what types of weapons cause “undue harm” 
would be helpful. As military weapons technology has progressed so much, the laws of 
war should also progress to account for what is available today. For example, is a drone 
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missile a weapon that causes undue harm? What about the fact that those missiles have 
also arbitrarily killed civilians? 
Finally, there is no international human rights tribunal to enforce the laws on the 
United States. Either international mechanisms ensuring compliance should be 
strengthened, or the U.S. Court system should adopt and enforce the laws of war to a 
fuller extent. While Bivens claims offer some remedy for violation, foreign persons have 
a much more difficult time finding any remedy or official body to bring their claims 




President Obama’s speech in May of 2013 indicates that he will recommit himself 
to shaping U.S. counterterrorism policy in accordance with IHRL and IHL. In light of 
past executive orders, Presidential mandates, speeches, and memos indicating a 
commitment to human rights while ignoring them in practice, it is difficult to tell what 
violations will actually be remedied, if any. The United States should adhere to its long-
standing commitment to human rights, in all areas of law and policy, including national 
security. Never are civil liberties more important or more vulnerable than when there is a 
threat to the security of our country. These times of insecurity and emergency are the 
precise times that the United States needs to provide an example to all other nations that 
justice can be served, citizens can be protected from harm, and human rights will still 
never be derogated from.  
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